In early June 2026, controversy arose over the appointment of Donald Pols, the former director of Milieudefensie, at Tata Steel. According to reporting by NRC (2 June 2026), Pols had started that week as Chief Sustainability Officer and Director of Communications, but the Executive Board of Tata Steel Netherland decided shortly afterwards not to continue with him. The reason was his South African past: according to NRC, during his student years Pols had been a leading figure in a far-right student movement. In its own press release of 2 June 2026, Tata Steel Nederland announced that it was terminating the contract with immediate effect, because not all information of importance to the Executive Board had been provided during the appointment procedure. According to the reporting, Pols himself has distanced himself from that past. Understanding probationary period dismissal is essential before you decide on your next steps.
The case raises a classic employment-law question about probationary dismissal: how far does a (prospective) employee’s duty extend to disclose sensitive information from their past on their own initiative, and where does that duty collide with the prohibition of distinction on grounds of political affiliation? Below, I set out the legal frameworks. One caveat regarding the facts in advance: the public sources show an immediate termination, but not whether a probationary clause had been agreed or whether this was a notice of termination during the probationary period. The following discusses that situation on the assumption that a valid probationary clause existed. The statutory framework can be consulted via the official Dutch legislation portal.
Dismissal during the probationary period: terminating without many formalities
Where a probationary period has been agreed, each party is entitled, for as long as that period lasts, to terminate the employment contract with immediate effect (Article 7:676 of the Dutch Civil Code, BW). The ordinary dismissal protection — preventive review by the UWV or the subdistrict court, notice periods, and the statutory grounds for dismissal — does not then apply. The condition, however, is that the probationary period is valid: it must have been agreed in writing and may not exceed the statutory maximum duration (Article 7:652 BW). The employer need not give the reason on its own initiative, but must communicate it in writing at the employee’s request.
That broad power is, however, not unlimited. A probationary dismissal, too, may not amount to prohibited distinction. Recent case law confirms this: both the District Court of The Hague (ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2025:19487) and the District Court of North Holland (ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2025:11085) ruled that an employee may not be dismissed during the probationary period either on account of his religion or belief. For political affiliation the statutory framework is identical, although a ruling on that specific point is still lacking. Where someone is dismissed solely on account of such a protected ground, the notice of termination may be unlawful or open to challenge even during the probationary period.
The question is therefore whether this case concerns the conviction itself, or something else. According to its press release, Tata Steel does not rely on Pols’s views, but on the fact that not all relevant information was shared during the appointment procedure. This shifts the centre of gravity away from the discrimination question and towards the question of whether the withholding of that information can independently support the termination.
The prohibition of discrimination: the AWGB, not “discrimination” in general
For the employment relationship, what is decisive is not a general “prohibition of discrimination” but the specific prohibition under the Dutch Equal Treatment Act (Algemene wet gelijke behandeling, AWGB). Political affiliation is a protected ground there, in both direct and indirect distinction (Article 1 AWGB). Distinction is prohibited, among other things, when offering a position and when entering into and terminating an employment relationship, subject to the statutory exceptions (Article 5(1) AWGB).
Also important is the evidentiary rule: if the employee puts forward facts that may give rise to a presumption of distinction, it is then for the employer to prove that it did not act contrary to the law (Article 10(1) AWGB). For an employer relying on something other than the conviction — for example, on the withholding of job-relevant information — this means that it must also be able to make that ground concretely plausible.
The duty to disclose, privacy, and its limits
Here lies the core, and precisely here restraint is appropriate. There is no general rule that a job applicant must disclose, on their own initiative, every reputation-sensitive aspect of their past. The starting point is that an employer’s questions must be job-relevant and that information unrelated to that — certainly sensitive data — falls within the applicant’s privacy. Political opinions are special categories of personal data: their processing is in principle prohibited (Article 9 GDPR and Article 22 of the Dutch GDPR Implementation Act, UAVG), subject to exhaustive exceptions. Specifically for political opinions, only a limited, functionally defined exception applies (Article 26 UAVG). An employer may therefore not simply ask about such data or process it.
On the other hand, providing incorrect or incomplete information about points essential to the position can weigh heavily in employment law — certainly where there has been an explicit question about it, or where the position imposes particular integrity or suitability requirements. The basis is then not a clearly delineated “spontaneous duty to disclose”, but an interplay of the doctrine of mistake (Article 6:228 BW), the job-related relevance of the information, and the open norms of good employer and employee conduct.
The case law shows that weight. In ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2026:2453, the failure — after explicit questions — to disclose a chronic condition and debts was sufficient to assume an urgent cause for dismissal; the subdistrict court moreover ruled that an extrajudicial annulment on grounds of mistake or fraud would have been valid. In ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2026:1077, a probationary dismissal was upheld after new information about the employee’s business past came to light: the employer was free to reconsider deployability and suitability on that basis. Those rulings confirm that reputation and integrity issues can be relevant, but not that an independent duty to disclose always exists.
Applied to this case: Pols was brought in as a figurehead for sustainability and communications at a company that is continually under public scrutiny, where credibility and reputation are central to the position. Whether a withheld past carries sufficient weight in those circumstances to support a termination depends on the concrete facts: what was asked, how job-relevant the information was, and what the employer itself knew or could have known.
The other side: the employer’s duty to investigate
Against the employee’s duty to provide information stands the employer’s duty to investigate. A party that fails to carry out reasonable investigation will later find it harder to rely on mistake: a mistake attributable to one’s own carelessness remains at the employer’s expense (Article 6:228(2) BW). For appointments at this level, screening and background checks — within the limits of the GDPR and proportionality — have by now become common practice.
Yet a lack of investigation does not automatically release the employee from their responsibility. The more clearly a fact is job-relevant and the more specifically it has been asked about, the more heavily its withholding weighs — even where the employer itself could have looked more closely.
Conclusion and points of attention
The case shows that two questions must be kept sharply apart, and that the outcome depends on the facts.
The first question is whether there is prohibited distinction on grounds of political affiliation. If so, the AWGB offers protection, including during a probationary period, and a heavy burden of proof rests on the employer. The second question is whether the employer can successfully rely on the withholding of information essential to the position. That may, in certain circumstances, provide a ground for termination or for annulment on grounds of mistake or fraud, but only insofar as the concrete questions, the job relevance, and the employer’s information position support it.
For employees, this means: you do not have to share everything, but where you know that a fact from your past is essential to the specific position — certainly where it is specifically asked about — silence may cost you dearly.
For employers, this means: name integrity and reputation risks explicitly in the recruitment process, ask targeted questions, and record which information is of essential importance for the appointment. A reliance on withholding stands stronger legally the more clearly the employer has been in advance about what it wanted to know.
Frequently asked questions
Can an employer simply dismiss me during the probationary period?
Where a valid probationary period has been agreed in writing (Article 7:652 BW), the employment contract can be terminated with immediate effect for as long as that period lasts, without a notice period and without prior review by the UWV or a court (Article 7:676 BW). The reason need not be given on the employer’s own initiative, but must be communicated to you in writing at your request. A dismissal that amounts to prohibited distinction remains impermissible during the probationary period as well.
Do I have to tell a new employer about my past on my own initiative?
Not about everything. The starting point is that only job-relevant information needs to be raised, and sensitive data falls in principle within your privacy. Providing incorrect or incomplete information about points essential to the position can, however, weigh heavily, certainly where there has been an explicit question about it or where the position imposes particular integrity or suitability requirements.
May an employer refuse or dismiss me because of my political conviction?
Political affiliation is a protected ground under the Dutch Equal Treatment Act. Distinction is prohibited when, among other things, offering a position and entering into and terminating an employment relationship (Article 5 AWGB), subject to statutory exceptions. If you put forward facts that give rise to a presumption of distinction, the employer must prove that it did not act contrary to the law (Article 10 AWGB).
What is the difference between the duty to disclose and the duty to investigate?
The duty to disclose rests on the applicant, the duty to investigate on the employer. An employer that fails to carry out reasonable investigation will find it harder to rely on mistake (Article 6:228(2) BW). Yet the employee’s responsibility does not simply lapse: for a clearly job-relevant fact, certainly after targeted questions, the withholding of it weighs heavily.
Questions about your situation?
This blog is a general explanation and not legal advice. Are you facing an issue concerning a job application, the duty to disclose, or dismissal during the probationary period — whether as an employee or as an employer? The employment-law attorneys at Law & More are happy to think along with you. Please feel free to contact us for a no-obligation conversation.
