Service accommodation is at the heart of a notable ruling in which the subdistrict court in Roermond, on 9 July 2026, dissolved the employment contract of a campsite manager on the ground of a disturbed working relationship. What makes this case notable is that the employee not only loses his job, but also has to vacate the service accommodation that came with his position.
In addition, the employee was granted his counterclaim for payment of more than 350 accrued overtime hours. This ruling (ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2026:6727) is well suited for a more in-depth legal discussion, as it brings together several doctrines: the grounds for dismissal under Section 7:669 of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC), the special status of service accommodation, the voidability of an unequal notice period, and the allocation of the burden of proof for overtime.
The facts
The employee had been employed since July 2025 by Huttopia De Meinweg B.V., a campsite operator based in Herkenbosch, initially as a camping assistant and, from December 2025, as campsite manager, on a salary of €3,234.83 gross based on a 38-hour working week. In April 2026, he received an official warning concerning three matters, and the following day, during a meeting with the general director and his regional manager, he was suspended from his duties. Under Article 4 of his employment contract, the employee had been provided with service accommodation on the campsite for the duration of the employment relationship.
The employer applied to the subdistrict court for dissolution of the employment contract, primarily on the grounds of culpable conduct (the e-ground) and a disturbed working relationship (the g-ground), and, in the alternative, on the ground of underperformance (the d-ground). The employer also sought an order for vacation of the service accommodation within three days of the ruling, if necessary by force. The employee contested the request, arguing that he had simply done his job and had raised issues as may be expected of a manager. In the event the employment contract was nonetheless dissolved, he requested a transition payment, fair compensation, continued use of the service accommodation, and payment of his accrued overtime.
The legal framework: Section 7:669 DCC
An employment contract may only be dissolved by the subdistrict court if there is a reasonable ground for doing so, as listed in Section 7:669(3) DCC, and if redeployment of the employee within a reasonable period is not possible or not appropriate (Section 7:669(1) DCC). Since the introduction of the Balanced Labour Market Act, the subdistrict court may also rely on the so-called cumulation ground under Section 7:669(3)(i) DCC, whereby two or more grounds that are individually insufficient may together justify dissolution. That was not necessary in this case: the court found the g-ground to be sufficiently supported by the facts on its own.
The g-ground requires a disturbed working relationship of such a nature that the employer cannot reasonably be required to continue the employment contract. Unlike the e-ground (culpable conduct), the g-ground does not require serious fault on the part of either party. This distinction proved decisive in this case for the question of whether fair compensation was due.
Disturbed working relationship: mutual mishandling, no serious fault on either side
The subdistrict court holds that there is a serious and lasting disturbance in the working relationship, without either party being predominantly at fault. The employee should have dealt more professionally with the problems he encountered on the work floor by discussing them with his supervisors and putting this in writing, rather than involving staff, other managers, and external parties such as the municipality in the conflict. At the same time, the court also finds fault with the employer: no attempt whatsoever was made to guide or support the employee. No improvement plan, no coaching, just a warning followed by suspension.
The court also examines whether the Whistleblowers Protection Act stands in the way of dissolution. This act protects employees who make an official report of a suspected wrongdoing against detrimental treatment by the employer. As it was neither argued nor established that the employee had made such an official report, and his conduct mainly consisted of involving his colleagues and external parties in his grievances without first making a formal internal or external report, the act does not offer him protection against dissolution in this case.
Because mutual trust is entirely absent and redeployment is not appropriate, the employment contract is dissolved on the g-ground. Pursuant to Section 7:671b(9)(a) DCC, the end date is set at the date on which the employment contract would have ended upon regular notice, less the duration of the dissolution proceedings: 1 September 2026. Because neither party acted with serious fault, the employee is awarded the transition payment (€1,354.11 gross), but not fair compensation under Section 7:671b(8)(c) DCC. The costs of proceedings are also offset between the parties.
The notice period: why four months did not hold up
A legally interesting part of the ruling concerns the notice period. The employment contract provided for a notice period of two months for both parties, whereas the statutory notice period for the employee under Section 7:672(2)(a) DCC is one month. The employee argued that, because his notice period had been contractually extended, the notice period applicable to the employer had to be at least double that under Section 7:672(8) DCC, i.e. four months.
The subdistrict court rejects this argument. Section 7:672(8) DCC is a provision designed to protect the employee: it provides that an extension of the employee’s notice period is only valid if the employer’s notice period is at least twice as long. If this requirement is not met, the employer’s notice period is not automatically extended by law; instead, the extension of the employee’s notice period becomes voidable.
The employee therefore did have the option of invoking the voidability of his own (extended) notice period and thereby falling back on the statutory one-month term, but that does not result in an automatic extension of the employer’s notice period to four months. This consideration is a useful illustration of how Section 7:672(8) DCC should be applied in practice, an application that is not always correctly understood in case law.
Vacating the service accommodation
The subdistrict court qualifies the accommodation as accommodation provided in the true sense of the term: housing that the employer has designated with a view to the nature of the work to be performed by the employee, where occupying it forms part of the obligations arising from the employment relationship. This distinguishes true service accommodation from accommodation in a looser sense, where the housing is arranged through the employer but is not functionally necessary for carrying out the role.
In the case of true service accommodation, the right of use is intrinsically linked to the employment relationship: it does not exist on the basis of an independent tenancy agreement under civil law, but flows directly from the employment contract. When the employment contract ends, the right to occupy the accommodation ends in principle as well, without any separate termination of tenancy being required.
The employee’s request for an independent right of use, separate from the employment contract, is therefore rejected. His request to be allowed to remain in the accommodation until 31 December 2026 is likewise not granted: the court holds that, given the possibility of interim termination provided for in his employment contract, the employee should in any event have taken into account the possibility of having to leave the service accommodation prematurely.
The employee must vacate the accommodation by 1 September 2026 at the latest, and remains liable for the agreed usage fee until that date. If he fails to vacate the accommodation on time, he will incur an additional usage fee of €1,000.00 per month, with any part of a month counting as a full month.
The employer’s request for authorisation to have the accommodation vacated by force, if necessary, is rejected by the court. That power already follows directly from Articles 555 et seq. in conjunction with Article 444 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, making separate authorisation unnecessary. Moreover, it could not be assessed in advance whether, and if so which, costs of any forced eviction should reasonably be borne by the employee.
Payment of overtime: burden of proof rests with the employer
On his counterclaim, the employee is granted full success. Both parties acknowledged that the employee had accrued between 357 and 367 overtime hours. The point of dispute was whether these hours, during the winter period when the campsite was closed, were deemed to have been taken as time off in lieu. The employer argued this was the case, but was unable to demonstrate that any agreement had been made to that effect, or that the employee had been informed that he needed to separately record his working hours during the closure period.
It is legally relevant that the employment contract referred to the Recreation collective labour agreement (cao Recreatie), under which the articles concerning the work schedule and overtime outside that schedule (Articles 11 and 13 of the collective agreement) had expressly been declared inapplicable.
It was neither argued nor established that the employer was nonetheless entitled to schedule the employee out of duty during the closure period subject to mandatory taking of accrued overtime. In line with settled case law, the subdistrict court holds that it is up to the employer to maintain a proper, reliable, and accessible system of time recording by which the actual working hours of each employee can be established. In the absence of a proper system of time recording, the resulting evidentiary difficulty falls to the employer’s account and risk.
Because the employer failed to demonstrate that it had been agreed that overtime accrued during the closure period would automatically be offset, and likewise failed to show that the employee had been warned that he needed to record his hours separately, the claim for payment of the overtime, amounting to €10,797.09 gross, is granted in full. The holiday already taken from 18 December 2025 to 6 January 2026 is deemed to have been offset against the ordinary holiday entitlement under the employment contract.
Practical implications
This ruling illustrates a number of points that frequently arise together in practice. First, a disturbed working relationship can arise without either party having acted with serious fault, which has consequences for the compensation payable.
Second, employers who apply an unequal, extended notice period for the employee should be aware that this is only valid if their own notice period is at least twice as long; if this requirement is not met, their own notice period is not automatically extended, but they run the risk that the employee successfully invokes voidability.
Third, in the case of service accommodation, a clear, written link to the existence of the employment contract is essential in order to actually be able to enforce vacation of the property when employment ends. Fourth, proper time recording is and remains the employer’s responsibility. In its absence, any uncertainty about overtime worked operates to the employee’s advantage.
Are you dealing with a disturbed working relationship, a dispute over service accommodation, or uncertainty about overtime? Feel free to contact Law & More for tailored advice.
Frequently asked questions
What is the difference between the e-ground and the g-ground for dismissal?
The e-ground (Section 7:669(3)(e) DCC) concerns culpable conduct or omission on the part of the employee, where a specific fault can be attributed to the employee. The g-ground (Section 7:669(3)(g) DCC) concerns a disturbed working relationship, where neither party necessarily has to bear serious fault. This distinction matters for the question of whether, in addition to the transition payment, fair compensation is also due: the latter only applies in the case of serious culpable conduct on the part of the employer.
Do I always have to leave my service accommodation as an employee when my employment contract ends?
That depends on the nature of the accommodation. In the case of true service accommodation, where occupying it is functionally necessary for performing the role and flows from the employment contract, the right of use in principle ends automatically when the employment relationship ends. In the case of accommodation in a looser sense, where there is rather an independent tenancy agreement that merely runs through the employer, ordinary tenancy protection rules apply, and vacation cannot simply be enforced when employment ends.
Can an employer agree a longer notice period for the employee without extending its own notice period?
No, not validly. Under Section 7:672(8) DCC, an extension of the employee’s notice period is only valid if the employer’s own notice period is at least twice as long. If this is not the case, the employee can have the extension of their own notice period annulled, falling back on the statutory term. This does not, however, automatically result in an extension of the employer’s notice period.
Who must prove how many overtime or additional hours have been worked?
In principle, it is up to the employer to maintain a proper and accessible system of time recording. If such a system is lacking, or if it is not shown that the employer gave the employee clear instructions on how working hours during special periods (such as a closure period) should be recorded, the resulting evidentiary difficulty falls to the employer’s account and risk. An employee who claims to have worked certain hours does not then need to prove this in detail if the employer is unable to provide evidence to the contrary.
Does the Whistleblowers Protection Act protect an employee who raises wrongdoing internally?
Protection under this act is linked to making an official report of a suspected wrongdoing, generally first internally and, if necessary, subsequently externally in accordance with a specific procedure. Merely expressing dissatisfaction to colleagues, other managers, or external parties, without such a formal report, does not automatically fall under the protection of this act. Employees who believe they have identified a wrongdoing are therefore well advised to follow the reporting procedure intended for this purpose and to document this properly.
Am I always entitled to fair compensation as an employee if my employer applies for dissolution?
No. Fair compensation is only awarded if the dissolution results from serious culpable conduct or omission on the part of the employer. In the case of dissolution on the g-ground, where both parties have contributed equally to the disturbed relationship, there is generally no room for such compensation. The transition payment is a different matter: this is in principle due as soon as the employment contract ends at the employer’s initiative, regardless of the degree of fault.
